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Abstract—There appear to be no anomalies in the aftermarket of a sample
of 4,848 U.S. IPOs over the period 1975 to 1995, except issues offered
below $6. Risk is priced in the aftermarket in accordance with Rubin-
stein’s asset-pricing model. Unlike under the efficient markets hypothesis
(EMH), however, market priors about the probability of future default are
not unbiased at the IPO date. Still, subsequent learning is rational: the
market uses Bayes’ law with a correct-likelihood function (of news given
the eventual fate of an issue). That is, the hypothesis of an efficiently
learning market (ELM) cannot be rejected. We produce direct evidence in
support of these statements, based on a new class of tests. We also provide
indirect evidence, by documenting a gradual convergence of IPO prices
towards EMH as issues mature.
I. Introduction
EVER since Ritter’s seminal empirical study (Ritter,1991), the post-issue performance of IPOs has been
considered to be a puzzle. In the long run, IPOs significantly
underperform standard benchmarks or equity in appropri-
ately matched firms. The puzzle has been confirmed in
numerous follow-up studies. (See, for example, the Spring
1993 issue of Financial Management, Jain and Kini (1994),
and Loughran and Ritter, 1995.) The evidence is now
generally interpreted as suggesting that the market is too
optimistic when pricing young issues. It realizes its mistakes
slowly, adjusting prices as the issues mature.
Although some have argued that the biases in the mar-
ket’s prior at the issue date are a natural consequence of
shortsale restrictions (Miller, 1977; Morris, undated), it
could also be a mere sign of the beliefs at a particular point
in time. Indeed, most studies focus on IPOs executed during
the 1970 and 1980s. That priors over this period were biased
does not necessarily imply irrationality, because the bias
was demonstrated to be there only ex post, that is, with the
benefit of hindsight.
Instead, it seems much more fruitful to ask whether
subsequent changes in the market’s beliefs were rational. If
beliefs can be expressed in terms of the chance numbers of
classical probability theory, we know precisely what this
means: changes should obey the rules of conditional prob-
ability (Bayes’ law).1 We will also take this to mean that the
market knows the likelihood of the signals it receives given
the eventual fate of an issue (will it default?). We set out to
test this weaker restriction on market beliefs.
Although the market will be assumed to know the like-
lihood function, we do allow for biases in the market’s prior
at the IPO date, which means that it need not be confirmed
in subsequent realizations. Therefore, we deviate from the
standard view that market beliefs are unbiased in all re-
spects (the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH)). But the
deviation is minimal: we let the market have biased priors
only at the issue date.
Both Bayesian updating and the use of correct-likelihood
functions are an integral part of the learning that is assumed
under EMH. Therefore, we will refer to our model of market
beliefs as the hypothesis of an efficiently learning market
(ELM). ELM differs from EMH only in that prior beliefs
may be biased.2
This article tests ELM in the IPO aftermarket with a
methodology that requires little or no information about the
actual market prior at the issue date and how priors varied
across issues. The methodology was originally developed
by Bossaerts (1996, 1998) and successfully applied to ex-
perimental winner-take-all markets by Bondarenko and
Bossaerts (2000), to digital option prices implied by index
call and put option prices by Bondarenko (1997), and to
straight index call options by Bossaerts (1998). The appli-
cations have one thing in common: they concern securities
with a clear bankruptcy state, like the equity contracts
studied here.
The specific framework of analysis is the following. At
the launch date, it is known that a certain number of IPOs
eventually fail (default), but it is not known exactly how
many and, if the issue at hand does fail, at what time. For
simplicity, the recovery rate conditional on bankruptcy is set
equal to zero.
Initial priors about the probability of bankruptcy are
arbitrary and may vary across IPOs. Price changes in the
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whether it is going to rain the next day. Of course, because our individual
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aftermarket reflect rational updating of these priors from
news about the fate of the company. The market is supposed
to understand how the news relates to bankruptcy. (It knows
the likelihood of the signals given the bankruptcy status.)
Likewise, the market correctly predicts the expected value
of equity in the company conditional on no default. (If
default occurs, the market of course knows that this value
will be zero.)
The tests that we use to verify this belief model (an
example of ELM) are simple and powerful. A novelty is that
they require the empiricist to split the available sample in a
winner category (companies that did not default) and a loser
category (companies that defaulted). Standard returns have
to be modified slightly and weighted appropriately. If ratio-
nal updating is rejected, the sign of the statistic provides
information on the nature of the inefficiency: whether the
market overreacts or underreacts to new information.
The need to split the sample into winner and loser
categories (in this article, we exclusively investigate the
former) turns sample-selection bias into a virtue: the results
will not suffer from survivorship bias by construction. That
is, even if one does not know the exact proportion of
winners and losers (perhaps because some histories of losers
became unavailable), our tests remain valid.
Our methodology tests for correct updating of priors
about the likely default of each company separately. The
methodology is of the event-study type: each history is
mapped in event time, with a common event time zero (the
IPO date); one loses potential information from the knowl-
edge that two histories occurred sequentially in calendar
time. This implies, in particular, that our methodology does
not investigate whether the default history of companies
floated earlier in calendar time were correctly reflected in
the priors at the issue date of subsequent IPOs. Our meth-
odology allows there to be such updating (priors can vary
arbitrarily across IPO histories), but it does not study its
rationality.3
In a rigorous and comprehensive way, this article tests the
conjecture made by Jegadeesh (1998), namely, that negative
aftermarket IPO excess returns should be rationalizable in
terms of the relatively negative news that the market re-
ceived about IPOs. Jegadeesh documented that a large
fraction of the aftermarket underperformance can be ex-
plained by three-day price changes around earnings an-
nouncements. However, he was not able to determine to
what extent these price changes were “correct”; moreover,
he focused on price reactions to well-identifiable events
(earnings announcements). The methodology of this article
tests whether price changes following any news event are
rational, in the sense that they reflect Bayesian updating
with a correct-likelihood function.
Unlike in Ritter (1991), we do not compare post-issue
IPO returns with contemporaneous returns on benchmark
portfolios (value-weighted or equally weighted market in-
dices, and size-based portfolios) or matched securities (sim-
ilar market capitalization and industry). Instead, we use an
explicit intertemporal asset-pricing model that has been
shown to be successful in other contexts, namely, Rubin-
stein’s model (Rubinstein, 1976). His model uses a pricing
kernel that is a simple nonlinear transformation of the return
on a value-weighted market index.
Our data set is approximately triple the size of Ritter’s,
and covers 4,848 U.S. IPOs in the period 1975 to 1995.
Although risk adjustment appears not to be necessary in the
earlier part of our sample (covering Ritter’s period of
1975–1984, when the risk premium recorded for U.S. stock
markets was historically exceptionally low), it becomes
important in the second part.4
It is also crucial that a value-weighted market index is
used in Rubinstein’s pricing kernel, in full consistency with
the model: we will demonstrate that an equally weighted
index is misspecified. In particular, as IPOs mature, their
prices converge to Rubinstein’s model with a value-
weighted portfolio as benchmark. In contrast, the fit of
Rubinstein’s model with an equally weighted index does not
improve with the age of IPOs.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The
next section discusses the data and summarizes past evi-
dence. Section III presents our approach and methodology.
Section IV discusses the aggregate empirical results. Sec-
tion V reports tests conditional on issue information. Sec-
tion VI corroborates the findings by documenting how fast
the market learns, and, hence, eliminates biases in the
pricing. Section VII concludes.
II. The Evidence
Our results are based on a merging of Ritter’s and van
Bommel’s sample5 of IPOs in the 1975–1995 period and the
CRSP 1998 NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ monthly return tape.
The two data sets were merged on the basis of PERM
number, or CUSIP when the PERM number was not avail-
able.
The following three IPOs were eliminated.
c All the IPOs for which the EXCHANGE variable in
Ritter’s dataset is equal to 4, corresponding to non-
Nasdaq OTC issues.
c IPOs for which the CRSP variable SHRCD, the share
code, differs from 10 or 11. These are certificates,
3 Loughran and Ritter have argued that priors at the IPO date have
recently gotten more in line with the actual post-issue performance,
indicating that priors are being updated between two issue dates. See
Loughran and Ritter (1995, p. 49).
4 Earlier versions of this article focused on IPOs in the period 1975–
1984. Our theory fit the data well without risk adjustment. The period
1985–1995 was added later on and provided a ten-year out-of-sample test.
The theory continued to fit remarkably well, but risk adjustment became
necessary.
5 An extensive analysis of Jos van Bommel’s data set can be found in van
Bommel (1999).
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ADRs, SBI (shares of beneficial interest), units, com-
panies incorporated outside the United States, Ameri-
cus primes and scores, closed-end funds, closed-end
fund companies incorporated outside the United
States, and REITS.
c IPOs of which the first digit of the SIC code equals 6
or 9, corresponding to financial institutions, insurance,
savings and loans (6), and utilities (9).
The latter exclusion was decided on because many IPOs
in that category were in fact well-established firms that
issued stock on the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ because of
regulatory changes. The nature of these IPOs differs dra-
matically from that of the typical one, wherein a young
company is floated, usually in a new area of industrial
activity.6
The final sample contained 4,848 IPOs, about triple
Ritter’s data set. For each IPO, trading and delisting infor-
mation, as well as a vector of 120 post-issue monthly returns
were extracted from the CRSP tape (together with 120
synchronous CRSP equally weighted and value-weighted
index returns). This means that ten-year post-issue perfor-
mance histories for each IPO were available, except of
course for the issues from 1989 on, for which only partial
histories were available (provided they survived until the
end of the return data, namely, December 1998).
A large fraction of these histories are incomplete, due to
delisting. The delisting information is important for the tests
to be reported later. CRSP provides delisting codes (DC),
which we grouped as follows.
c Active issues: DC 100
c Mergers: DCs 200–203
c Exchanges: DC 300–390
c Liquidations and forced delistings: DCs 550–588, 400,
and 700 (to be referred to as Liquidations)
c Inactive but Unknown status: DCs 500–520
Active issues, mergers, and exchanges will be classified in
a category that we will refer to as winners: these are the
successful IPOs. In contrast, liquidations and unknowns will
be categorized as losers.
We recorded the delisting status at the end of each
twelve-month period after the issue date. This status is
determined as follows. Consider the end of the jth twelve-
month period. If the corresponding point in calendar time is
before the recorded delisting date or the issue was never
delisted, then DC is set equal to 100 (active issue). Other-
wise, it is set equal to the DC in the CRSP tape.
Table 1 provides descriptive information of the distribu-
tion of delisting status for each twelve-month period. Ob-
viously, the number of active issues decreases as time
passes. Only 1,037 issues have ten-year active trading
histories. This does not mean that the other issues went sour:
1,035 IPOs were merged at one point in the ten-year history,
and 63 disappeared through an exchange of stock.
Still, 1,237 IPOs were listed as liquidations at the ten-
year mark. In other words, the probability of failure is rather
high (35.0% of the sample). Many of the 165 unknowns
should also be considered losers. So, roughly three out of
ten IPOs will not be a success.
This rather high failure rate makes all the more dramatic
Ritter’s observation that the post-issue performance of IPOs
has been dismal. His cumulative average return, however,
went out to only three years after the issue date, and one
wonders what happened further. After three years, about
one-third of the failures (losers) had left the sample, and,
hence, do not affect the average returns anymore. On the
other hand, many mergers and exchanges had also occurred
prior to the three-year mark. A large fraction of these
generated substantial abnormal returns, which will not af-
fect the IPO post-issue performance measure after the
merger or exchange.
The evidence of underperformance does not disappear
when extending the horizon beyond Ritter’s three-year win-
dow. Figure 1 displays the cumulative average return (CAR)
in excess of the return on the equally weighted and value-
weighted CRSP indices up to ten years after the issue date.
Only after approximately 72 months (six years) is there any
tendency to reversal.
Figure 1 confirms Ritter’s finding: the underperformance
of IPOs in the period 1975–1995 was pronounced. For
instance, at sixty months (five years), the CAR relative to
the value-weighted index is 240%, which means that an
investment in the average IPO would have generated a level
of wealth after sixty months that is 40% below that of an
investment in the value-weighted CRSP index.
The fact that the CAR plot with value-weighted bench-
mark levels off after 72 months (six years) may indicate that
the remaining (2,087) IPOs have finally become “estab-
lished firms,” which would mean that the market has learned
how to price those issues correctly. In fact, this is an
explanation in terms of learning, very much in the spirit of
this article. We will confirm this point later.
Although we do not want to jump ahead too fast, it may
be worthwhile to point out here that we will be able to
explain the underperformance anomaly with a value-
weighted benchmark. This is significant, because the CAR
plot is worst for precisely this benchmark. That attempts to
use an equally weighted benchmark fail can already be seen
from figure 1: the CAR increases after sixty months, im-
plying that the market does not correctly price IPOs even
after they have become mature (relative to an equally
weighted benchmark). We will demonstrate this explicitly at
6 We used the SIC code that CRSP assigned to an issue on the 1998 tape
to determine exclusion. This code often deviates from Ritter’s, which was
constructed to better reflect industry affiliation on the IPO date itself.
Hence, we ended up with some companies that were in the excluded
industries at the IPO date. Because they were later reclassified by CRSP,
or considered to be in a different industry altogether, these companies
where deemed to be more typical IPOs, and, hence, retained in our study.
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the end of the article. Of course, asset-pricing theory re-
quires one to use a value-weighted index and not an equally
weighted index. In other words, the finding that the equally
weighted index does not work provides further support of
asset-pricing theory.
The motivation for this article is that the plot in figure 1
does not necessarily convey much evidence of an anomaly
unless one is willing to endow the market with a question-
able level of forecasting accuracy. Here is why.
Figure 1 is meant to display the performance of a
portfolio of IPOs at different horizons. The composition
of this portfolio changes substantially over time. Table 1
documents the complexity of the dynamics of the com-
position: firms continuously exit, because of success
(mergers and exchanges) or failure (liquidations and
unknowns).7 In previous studies, “correct” pricing of this
portfolio is interpreted as implying that the cumulative
excess return should be zero on average, independent of
the horizon. But this would require a high amount of
foresight in the mind of the market. Not only must the
market know beforehand what proportion of IPOs will
exit (for example, that approximately 35% will eventu-
ally exit because of liquidations (see table 1)), but also
how the exit is distributed over time. For instance, the
market must have forecasted correctly that the number of
exits because of liquidations peaks at four years (190),
and that the maximum number of exits because of merg-
ers occurs earlier, at two years (181).8
Unless the empiricist believes that the market cor-
rectly predicts not only the number and nature of exits
out of the portfolio, but also their distribution over time,
anomalous behavior in plots like figure 1 can be ex-
pected. The result could merely reflect surprises about the
actual patterns of exit from the portfolio. But this would
mean that the market’s priors about default were initially
biased. This conjecture is precisely what our article
studies.
Ritter also studied the aftermarket performance condi-
tional on issue information, such as level of IPO underpric-
ing. Our study continues the tradition. In particular, post-
issue return histories are stratified according to the
following criteria.
c Underpricing: Issues are sorted by size of underpric-
ing (difference between first aftermarket price and IPO
offer price), and then arranged in ten deciles, num-
7 Hensler, Rutherford, and Springer (1997) use an accelerated failure
time model to explain the complex dynamics of IPO survival in the
aftermarket.
8 Of course, table 1 provides only estimates, but the sample size reduces
the error to a minimum. For instance, with a sample of 4,848 observations,
the standard error on the estimate of the probability of liquidation in the
first four years, 13.3%, is =0.133 (1 2 0.133)/4848, (that is, 0.5%).
TABLE 1.—DISTRIBUTION OF IPO STATUS AT VARIOUS POINTS UP TO TEN YEARS AFTER ISSUE DATE; BASED ON 4,848 U.S. IPOS IN THE PERIOD 1975–1995;
DELISTING STATUS AS RECORDED ON THE 1998 CRSP TAPE
Reference Point Activea Mergersb Exchangesc Liquidationsd Unknowne
1 Year 4,780 22 3 29 14
(98.6)f (0.5) (0.1) (0.6) (0.3)
2 Years 4,388 179 13 205 63
(90.5) (3.7) (0.3) (4.2) (1.3)
3 Years 3,932 360 22 419 115
(81.1) (7.4) (0.5) (8.6) (2.4)
4 Yearsg 3,260 529 33 609 139
(71.3) (11.6) (0.7) (13.3) (3.0)
5 Yearsh 2,649 675 45 794 153
(61.4) (15.6) (1.0) (18.4) (3.5)
6 Yearsi 2,087 785 54 941 158
(51.9) (19.5) (1.3) (23.4) (3.9)
7 Yearsj 1,675 865 60 1,058 160
(43.9) (22.7) (1.6) (27.7) (4.2)
8 Yearsk 1,396 924 60 1,125 163
(38.1) (25.2) (1.6) (30.7) (4.4)
9 Yearsl 1,204 979 61 1,192 163
(33.5) (27.2) (1.7) (33.1) (4.5)
10 Yearsm 1,037 1,035 63 1,237 165
(29.3) (29.3) (1.8) (35.0) (4.7)
a CRSP delisting code (DC) 100.
b DCs 200–203.
c DCs 300–390.
d Includes forced delistings; DCs 550–588, 400, and 700.
e Includes inactive issues; DCs 500–520.
f Percent of total.
g From year 4 on, the sample excludes 278 IPOs floated in 1995.
h From year 5 on, the sample excludes 254 IPOs floated in 1994 as well.
i From year 6 on, the sample excludes 291 IPOs floated in 1993 as well.
j From year 7 on, the sample excludes 207 IPOs floated in 1992 as well.
k From year 8 on, the sample excludes 150 IPOs floated in 1991 as well.
l From year 9 on, the sample excludes 69 IPOs floated in 1990 as well.
m From year 10 on, the sample excludes 62 IPOs floated in 1989 as well.
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bered 1 to 10, with category 10 containing the most-
underpriced issues, (that is, those with the highest
aftermarket price relative to offer price).
c Industry classification: Issues are arranged in classes
depending on the first digit of their three-digit SIC
code at IPO date.
c Price level: Issues are sorted by offer price, and then
arranged in ten deciles, numbered 1 to 10, with cate-
gory 10 containing the most-expensive issues.
With the underpricing categorization, one can investigate
whether the IPO anomaly is specific to extremely under-
priced issues. Likewise, the industry-classification and
price-level categorizations enable one to relate aftermarket
underperformance to industry and offer price, respectively,
or to study whether the anomaly is specific to early issues in
an industry.
III. Theory
A. Mere Optimism or Fads?
Ritter’s findings have been interpreted as evidence of
optimism, or even fads. The term fads reflects something
irrational: the market overprices the issues and stub-
bornly holds on to its beliefs, until finally correcting in
the face of evidence of failures. But optimism is not
necessarily irrational. It may merely be a characterization
of someone’s beliefs at a point in time. Optimism be-
comes irrational only if it is not corrected (updated)
properly as contrary evidence emerges. So, optimism is
not the problem; instead, the obstinacy is. The aim of this
article is to investigate whether IPO underperformance is
merely a consequence of optimistic beliefs at the issue
date of the IPOs, or whether it also reflects obstinacy (or
its opposite, overexuberance). The latter would be evi-
dence of irrationality.
The article does so in the context of a framework that
allows the empiricist to be agnostic of the actual priors of
the market at the issue date and to avoid specification of
the payoff-generating process beyond the proposition that
there is a bankruptcy state in which the issue becomes
worthless.
The methodology was originally developed by Bossaerts
(1996, 1998) and will be summarized here in terms of the
IPO application. The framework is presented first; the tests
are discussed next.
FIGURE 1.—CUMULATIVE AVERAGE RETURNS IN EXCESS OF THE RETURNS ON (i) THE EQUALLY WEIGHTED (EW) CRSP INDEX, (ii) THE VALUE
WEIGHTED (VW) CRSP INDEX, UP TO 120 MONTHS (TEN YEARS) AFTER ISSUE DATE
Based on 4,848 U.S. IPOs in the period 1975–1995.
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B. Framework
Let t index (event) time, measured in, say, months (t 5 0,
1, 2, . . . ). We want to test rational learning in a period up
to T months after the issue date, based on the status of the
IPO at some future reference point T* . T. T is either a
fixed point in event time, such as eighteen months after the
issue date, or it is the date of the last available price if
delisting occurred prior to this fixed point.
Assuming that no dividends are paid or that dividends are
continuously reinvested, the price at t, pt, predicts the value
of equity (with dividends reinvested) in the future. Let VT*
denote the value of equity at the future reference point T*.
Let ft denote the market’s information at time t.
Assuming that an infinite-lived representative investor
exists, holding logarithmic preferences, Rubinstein showed
that equilibrium prices should satisfy the following stochas-
tic Euler equation (Rubinstein, 1976):
EsF 1RM,t11 pt11UftG 5 pt, (1)
where RM,t11 denotes the return on the (value-weighted)
market portfolio over the period (t, t 1 1). The conditional
expectation in this expression is computed on the basis of
the market’s subjective beliefs (whence the superscript s).
This subjective expectation need not coincide with the
“true” probability, which should be interpreted as the one
that can be estimated from the actual frequency of future
events. It will be specified shortly to what extent the
market’s beliefs may be incorrect.
Because equation (1) holds for all t, it is more convenient
to work with scaled prices, defined as follows:
p˜0 5 p0,
p˜t 5
1
RM,tRM,t21 . . . RM,1
pt, ~t 5 1, . . . , T* 2 1!, (2)
p˜T*~5V˜ T*! 5
1
RM,T*RM,T*21 . . . RM,1
VT*.
The stochastic Euler equation in (1) then becomes
Es@ p˜t11uft# 5 p˜t, (3)
and recursion generates the following pricing equation:
p˜t 5 Es@V˜ T*uft#, (4)
as if investors were risk neutral and had a zero discount
rate.9
By time T*, the issue may have defaulted, in which case
the recovery rate is assumed to be zero, and, hence, V˜ T* 5
0.10 Absent bankruptcy, V˜ T* . 0. The market may hold
incorrect beliefs about the frequency of occurrence of bank-
ruptcy. Conditional on no default, however, the market’s
beliefs about the (scaled) value V˜ T* are correct.
The actual biases in the market’s prior about bankruptcy
are left unspecified. They can be arbitrary. Moreover, they
can vary across issues. We do require, however, that the
market learn rationally about the potential bankruptcy of
individual issues, using its information ft. In other words,
the market uses the rules of conditional probability (Bayes’
law) to update its beliefs, based on the correct likelihood of
signals given the final outcome (default or not).
It was mentioned that the position of the reference date
T* is arbitrary: any date after T would do. It must lie after
T, however (T* . T), because we cannot allow for perfect
revelation that the company defaulted during the period for
which returns are computed (t 5 1, . . . , T). Our method-
ology will separate winners (firms that have not defaulted
by T*) from losers (those that defaulted by T*). Firms that
announce default on or before T will record a return of
2100% (given our assumption of a zero recovery rate).
Hence, conditional on default, returns are predictable. We
will also use what we refer to as modified returns, which are
computed with the end-of-period price as basis. Upon de-
fault, the price (even when scaled as in equation (2)) drops
to zero, and, hence, the modified return will be unbounded.11
In our IPO data set, the recovery rate of IPOs is not
always zero. We only use this assumption because it sim-
plifies matters substantially. Moreover, recent evidence sug-
gests that the recovery rate on delisted firms is far below
what CRSP has traditionally been reporting. See Shumway
(1997).
Likewise, some IPOs in our data set may have been
known to have defaulted prior to T. We leave a six-month
period between T and T* to mitigate problems caused by
early revelation of default.12 Given how clean our results
are, the reader will be able to confirm that our empirical
results appear not to have been affected much by early
(potential) revelation.
In our world, it will no longer be true that actual changes
in prices (properly scaled) will be unpredictable, even if ex
ante expected changes are. Mathematically,
9 The informed reader will recognize that we implemented the deflation
procedure that has become standard in mathematical finance.
10 It is possible to accommodate a nonzero recovery value. It is neces-
sary, however, that the recovery value be fixed. The test results that are
reported in this article should be adjusted slightly if the recovery value is
argued to be nonzero.
11 See Bossaerts (1996) for an in-depth analysis of the problems caused
by early revelation of default.
12 Delisting announcements of distressed firms invariably occur after the
last available price on the CRSP tape. The end of the time series from
which returns are computed, T, must necessarily be based on available
price data. Hence, T cannot be beyond the point of the last recorded price
on the CRSP tape and therefore occurs before potential delisting. Never-
theless, default could still be announced way before the delisting date,
potentially invalidating our tests.
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EF p˜t11 2 p˜tp˜t uftG
may be nonzero. In contrast with equation (3), the condi-
tional expectation is now computed from the actual (true)
distribution of price changes over month t 1 1 across
issues. (The absence of the superscript s should make the
distinction clear.) Defining the return to be
r˜t11 5
p˜t11 2 p˜t
p˜t
,
this can be translated to mean that the return may be
nonzero on average. Mathematically, the following need not
hold:
E@r˜t11uft# 5 0. (5)
This restriction only obtains under EMH, that is, when the
market holds unbiased priors. Existing studies of IPOs have
focused on testing equation (5) (albeit based on other
risk-adjustment models, not necessarily Rubinstein’s). The
tests reject.
C. Methodology
We allow beliefs about the probability of bankruptcy to
be arbitrary, and even to vary across issues. Moreover, we
remain agnostic about the processes generating payoffs and
information, although we do require that the market use the
correct-likelihood function in updating its beliefs. In such a
context, one would reasonably conjecture that rational
learning does not impose falsifiable restrictions. In other
words, any set of price histories could be explainable in
terms of some set of biases in the market’s prior and some
payoff- and information-generating processes.
Bossaerts (1996, 1998) proves that this conjecture is
wrong. Learning does restrict the dynamic behavior of
prices, even in this fairly generic environment. The restric-
tions are not apparent from a study of returns as in past
studies of IPOs.
Foremost, the restrictions emerge only after splitting the
sample in two subsamples, one of histories of winners
(issues that did not default by T*) and those of losers (issues
that defaulted by T*).
Further, the selection bias introduced by studying the
subsamples of winners and losers separately implies that
returns will not necessarily be equal to zero, even if priors
happen to be correct. Indeed, returns on winners, for in-
stance, can be expected to be positive on average. As a
consequence, performance measures that differ from the
traditional return will have to be studied.
Here are the main restrictions. To simplify the discussion,
we will discuss only restrictions involving winners.13
First, define the modified return:
x˜t11 5
p˜t11 2 p˜t
p˜t11
. (6)
The modified return differs from the traditional return in
that the future (scaled) price is used as basis.
For W issues that did not default before T* (indexed i 5
1, . . . , W), compute the average modified return:
1
W O
i51
W S 1T 2 1 O
t51
T21
x˜i,t11D . (7)
Fact 1: For winners, the expected average modified re-
turn is nonpositive. If the scaled payoff upon winning is
correlated with information about default status, the ex-
pected average modified return is strictly negative. Other-
wise, it is zero.
To build some intuition as to why fact 1 is true, consider
the average traditional return. If this is computed on the
basis of histories of winners only, one expects a positive
bias, at least if the market correctly reacted to news that the
issues were going to be winners. To offset this bias, positive
returns should be multiplied by a factor smaller than 1, and
negative returns should be multiplied by a factor larger than
1. The ratio p˜t/p˜t11 is such a factor. Multiplying the tradi-
tional return with this factor produces the modified return.
The factor more than offsets the bias: the resulting variable,
namely, the modified return, will be nonpositive on average.
It will be strictly negative if the payoff is correlated with
news about eventual success (for example, signals that
indicate a reduction in the probability of default also imply
a higher payout conditional on no default).
Fact 1 is an implication of ELM. In particular, the strict
negativity of the modified return obtains not just because the
market reacted favorably to news that the issues at hand
eventually became winners, but precisely because this re-
action was correct, that is, in accordance with Bayes’ law,
and on the basis of the correct likelihood.
It deserves emphasis that market priors about the likely
default of the issue may be arbitrary; in particular, they need
not be correct, and they can vary across issues. Intuition for
why the prior does not matter can be obtained indirectly,
from observing that fact 1 is based only on the winners: no
information about the losers (timing, numbers) is involved.
To test whether the market’s prior is unbiased, one would
need to know at least how many losers there were. Because
fact 1 does not use this information, it must be testing
something that is independent of any bias in the prior.
Indeed, it does: it merely tests whether the updating is
correct (use of Bayes’ law and a correct-likelihood func-
tion).
A specific weighting scheme makes the average modified
return zero. Let V˜ i,T* denote the time-T* scaled value on
13 Previous versions of this article discussed restrictions on losers as
well; see also Bossaerts (1996, 1998).
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winner issue i (i 5 1, . . . , W). Consider the following
weighted average modified return:
1
W O
i51
W
V˜ i,T*S 1T 2 1 O
t51
T21
x˜i,t11D . (8)
Fact 2: For winners, the expected weighted average mod-
ified return is zero.
The intuition is as follows. The weighting scheme gives
more weight to issues with a large payoff at T*. These are
the issues that must also have had the larger price run-up
(that is, higher (modified) returns) in anticipation of the
larger payoff. Indeed, we assume that market prices cor-
rectly incorporate the generally favorable information. Is-
sues with lower T* values have had lower modified returns,
but are weighted less in the weighted average modified
return. Altogether, the weighted average modified return is
expected to be zero.
Again, it should be underscored that fact 2 obtains irre-
spective of the market’s prior about default: it may be
biased, and it may vary across issues.
Some may find fact 1 to be redundant, in view of the
cleaner restriction in fact 2. Fact 2, however, uses a weight-
ing that may affect the power of the test, depending on the
data at hand. We will discuss the issue of power shortly.
The two facts were expressed in terms of unconditional
averages. They also obtain if conditioning on issue infor-
mation, such as IPO underpricing or IPO offer price.
Fact 3: Facts 1 and 2 continue to hold when the averages
are computed for subclasses of winning IPOs formed on the
basis of issue information.
If the averages are not computed from the first aftermar-
ket trade on, but from some future initial date t , T, facts
1 and 2 also hold when conditioning on information that
emerged after the issue date, up to time t.
The three facts can easily be tested, because they restrict
the behavior of readily available statistics, based on simple
price information. We chose not to use absolute price
information, but wealth ratios based on an investment at
IPO of $1, with reinvestment of possible dividends. That
way, the future values V˜ i,T* become normalized, reducing
their cross-sectional variation, and improving the power of
tests of fact 2.
D. Meaning of Rejections
Before turning to the results, it is important to delineate
the information that would be conveyed by rejections of the
facts.
Most information could be conveyed by tests of fact 2,
because, unlike fact 1, the alternative hypothesis would
include two cases: positive and negative weighted average
modified returns. Here is an interpretation in terms of a
market whose price reaction may be correct in the long run,
but either too slow or too fast in the short run.
Remember the intuition behind facts 1 and 2: the tradi-
tional return on winners is positive, because of the selection
bias and the market’s learning; to offset this, returns must be
multiplied by a factor that is below 1 for positive returns and
above 1 for negative returns; if the market learns rationally,
the factor that does the job is the ratio of today’s price over
tomorrow’s (deflated) price; it converts the standard return
into the modified return.
Positive weighted average modified returns are a sign of
underreaction of the market to new information. In other
words, price changes amount only to a fraction of the full
Bayesian update; further adjustments are made later. It
implies that price movements are less extreme than in the
rational case, making the factor that transforms standard
returns into modified returns less variable. As a result, the
bias caused by looking only at winners is not entirely offset.
Negative weighted average modified returns are a sign of
overreaction of the market to new information. Price
changes overcompensate for the Bayesian update, creating
the necessity for future reversals. It implies that price
movements are more volatile than in the rational case,
making the factor that transforms traditional returns into
modified returns more variable. Hence, the selection bias is
overadjusted.
In classical tests of EMH, return autocorrelations convey
signals of overreaction and underreaction of the market to
new information. Under ELM, priors may be biased, and
return autocorrelations do not provide the right signal.
Moreover, autocorrelations only provide information about
the behavior of deviations of returns from the mean; they do
not test the appropriateness of the mean return. In contrast,
the weighted average modified return of winners must be
zero even if priors are biased (fact 2). Moreover, it conveys
information about the correctness of both price changes net
of the average change and the average change itself.
Likewise, in standard tests of EMH, significant projec-
tions of returns on past information (Teoh, Welch, & Wong,
1998) provide evidence against the theory. Under ELM,
such projections do not convey conclusive evidence. Only
projections of weighted modified returns on past informa-
tion (such as issue information) do.14
E. Cross-Sectional Independence
Our tests of the facts will be based on the averages in
equation (7) and (8). The validity of the test statistics
(simple z-statistics, asymptotically normally distributed) re-
lies on cross-sectional independence. That is, we assume
14 In the appendix of earlier versions of this article (the interested reader
can obtain a copy at ftp://hss.caltech.edu/pub/pbs/ipoold.pdf), we con-
structed a simple model of an overreacting or underreacting market. The
construction was the basis for a Monte Carlo analysis of the power of tests
based on fact 2. It revealed that autocorrelations may be low even in a
substantially irrational market. In contrast, tests based on fact 2 had power.
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that modified returns (in equation (7)) and weighted modi-
fied returns (in equation (8)) are independent across the
winners used to compute the averages. However, to the
extent that there is clustering of IPOs in time, this assump-
tion may not be correct.
Although there are some peak periods for IPO activity,
our sample covers twenty years, which diminishes the
potential effect of clusters. Still, at one point we will stratify
our sample according to industry affiliation. IPOs within an
industry are notoriously clustered in time (for example, oil
exploration IPOs in our sample almost invariably occurred
in the late 1970s), potentially invalidating our independence
assumption. Therefore, the results based on industry strati-
fication must be interpreted with caution.
Because we scale prices using the return on the market
portfolio before computing returns, we effectively do elim-
inate correlation caused by marketwide price movements. In
traditional event-study analysis, the analogous technique
would be to use market model residuals.
Clustering biases our tests against the null hypothesis. If
IPOs are clustered in time, and there is still cross-sectional
dependence after elimination of the market component, we
expect average returns (whether weighted, modified, or not)
to be significant.
Cross-sectional dependence caused by clustering in cal-
endar time is of course a well-known problem in event
studies. Notice, however, that we need cross-sectional de-
pendence in returns (after correcting for the market return)
only for winners. In previous studies of IPO aftermarket
performance (which were also event studies), independence
had to hold across winners and losers, because both types of
IPOs were used in the tests. This means, among others, that
there could not be any cross-sectional dependence in de-
fault. Yet, it is well known that default occurrence is
correlated. If one company defaults, it is more likely that
another one defaults, and so forth. Because we use only
winners in our tests, the inference is immune to correlation
in defaults. We really only need independence of returns
(adjusted for the market return) conditional on being a
winner.
IV. Tests Based on the Performance of All the Winners
We first report results from unconditional tests (facts 1
and 2). Figure 2 provides graphical evidence. The plots
provide point estimates (horizontal dashes) and 95%-confi-
dence intervals (vertical line segments).
The figure reports averages for different post-issue refer-
ence points (T* in the previous section), spaced at one-year
intervals. For each reference date, averages were computed
using return data from the first aftermarket trade up to six
months before the reference date at the latest. (In terms of
the notation of the previous section, T is positioned up to six
months before T*.) IPOs were followed up to ten years after
issue date; hence, there were ten reference points, at the end
of years 1, 2, . . . , 10.15
The averages displayed in figure 2 are computed on the
basis of overlapping periods (the averages for the period
ending after two years are based on observations from the
first year as well). Hence, the results are not independent
across reference points. This continues a tradition of the
event-study literature in general and the empirical IPO
literature in particular.16
In addition to the average modified return, the average
(traditional) return and the weighted average modified re-
turn, figure 2 shows results for the weighted average tradi-
tional return. This statistic is computed from equation (8)
after substituting the traditional return r˜i,t11 for the modified
return x˜i,t11. It gives a good benchmark to gauge the power
of the test. (Of course, the presence of rejections in itself
will confirm power.) We expect the average traditional
returns, weighted or not, to be strictly positive, because of
the bias from winner selection. The power of the tests may
be questioned, however, if the weighted average return is
seldom found to be significantly positive. Our reporting the
(equally weighted) average traditional return in figure 5
plays the same role: one expects it to be significantly
positive; if not, there is perhaps too much noise in the data
for our tests to be powerful.
Altogether, the plots in figure 2 are meant to provide
evidence about the hypothesis of ELM, in conjunction with
the asset-pricing model used to adjust for risk (Rubinstein’s
model).
First, the upper-left plot in figure 2 provides overwhelm-
ing support for fact 1: we always reject that the average
modified return is nonnegative. Likewise, the restriction of
fact 2, that the weighted average modified return ought to be
zero, cannot be rejected, except with a horizon of one year,
where it is significantly positive. See the lower-left plot of
figure 2.
The insignificance of the weighted average modified
returns cannot be attributed to the variability of the weights:
the lower-right plot of figure 2 demonstrates that the
weighted average standard returns are always highly signif-
icant. The latter are positive, because of the selection bias:
the averages are computed on the basis of winners only.
But the selection bias is not severe enough for the equally
weighted average standard return to be significantly positive
except for horizons beyond six years. See the upper-right
plot of figure 2. The reason is simple: the average per-
formance of U.S. IPOs, whether winner or loser, has been
15 Reference point values (V˜ i,T* in the previous section) for issues that
merged or were exchanged (mergers and exchanges) were computed by
risk-free reinvesting (at the three-month T-bill rate) all the wealth accu-
mulated up to the date of the last available return on the CRSP tape, and
scaling in accordance with equation (2).
16 In principle, one could correct standard errors for the overlap by
jointly modifying the statistics in such a way that a functional central limit
theorem can be applied.
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so bad (see figure 1) that even selection bias hardly annihi-
lates it.
Based on the evidence from the unconditional tests, it is
fair to conclude that the post-issue price series do not reflect
any irrationality. Priors may have been biased, but this did
not keep the market from correctly learning about future
values, in accordance with ELM. Simultaneously, the mar-
ket appears to price IPOs as in Rubinstein’s model of asset
pricing. That is, prices are set as if there exists a represen-
tative investor with logarithmic preferences.
V. Conditioning On Issue Information
We now report results on price histories sampled on the
basis of information from the IPO itself. This should verify
fact 3. We will focus on the weighted average modified
return, which is the most convenient and cleanest statistic to
gauge the validity of ELM in the aftermarket.
A. Stratification by Industry
Let us first split the sample of winners by industry. Table
2 lists the nine industries with their (two-digit SIC) code.
The reader should be warned beforehand that stratifica-
tion per industry may introduce serious cross-sectional de-
pendence, to the extent that the fate of IPOs within an
industry is highly correlated. Hence, the results should be
interpreted with caution, and one may want to rely more on
stratification that has less tendency to generate cross-sec-
tional dependence.
Figure 3 replicates the lower-left plot of figure 2 after
splitting the sample into industry-based subsamples. There
are anomalies (rejections of the null that the weighted
average modified return equals zero), but the pattern is not
FIGURE 2.—ONE-MONTH RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS (HORIZONTAL BARS) AND 95%-CONFIDENCE INTERVALS (VERTICAL BARS) ON 4,848 U.S. IPOS IN THE
PERIOD 1975–1995, FOR DIFFERENT HORIZONS, WINNERS ONLY
Risk adjustment is based on Rubinstein’s model, using the value-weighted CRSP index.
TABLE 2.—INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION CODES (SIC)
SIC Description
0* Agriculture and forestry
1* Natural resources and construction
2* Pharmaceutical, chemical, food, wood, and textile products
3* Industrial and consumer durable goods
4* Transportation, communication, and energy
5* Wholesale and retail
6* Finance, insurance, and real estate
7* Services
8* Health care, accounting, and legal services
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clear. We do expect to see a certain number of rejections, but
there are a rather large number of them in industries 1* and
2*. The former includes a fair number of oil and gas
exploration issues from the late 1970s that went sour in the
early 1980s, after a dramatic drop in crude-oil prices. The
latter includes a large number of biotech issues from the late
1980s that also fared poorly.
In fact, the anomalies in industries 0*, 1*, and 8* turn out
to be price-level anomalies in disguise. That is, the anom-
alies that will be discussed next and that are related to the
issue price level are far more systematic (and presumably
also less affected by potential cross-sectional dependence).
Because industry and issue price level are correlated, the
price-level anomalies show up scattered across industries.
We will document the correlation between price level and
industry later on.
B. Stratification by Issue Price Level
We split the sample of winners according to issue price
level. Decile 1 includes the IPOs with the 10% lowest price,
decile 2 includes IPOs in the next 10% pricing category, and
so on. Figure 4 displays the results.
There is a very clear pattern in the weighted average
modified returns in figure 4: they are highly significantly
negative for deciles 1, 2, and 3, for virtually all horizons.
These include all IPOs with an issue price below $6.
Beyond $6, there is no systematic anomaly. The occasional
rejections could be expected by chance.
As explained before, significantly negative weighted
average modified returns are a sign of overreaction: the
volatility is much higher than expected given the mar-
ket’s prior and likelihood (under the condition that the
latter is correct).
Table 3 demonstrates that the issue-price effect will partly
translate into an industry effect because IPO prices are
systematically lower in certain industries. The table docu-
ments that the median issue price is below $6 in industries
0* and 1*. The next-lowest median can be found in industry
8*. These three industries together generated most anoma-
lies. (See figure 3.)
C. Stratification by Underpricing
It is surprising that stratification of the winner sample by
issue underpricing (defined as the difference between the
FIGURE 3.—ONE-MONTH RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS IN PERCENT (HORIZONTAL BARS) AND 95%-CONFIDENCE INTERVALS (VERTICAL BARS) ON 4,848 U.S.
IPOS IN THE PERIOD 1975–1995, FOR DIFFERENT HORIZONS, STRATIFIED BY INDUSTRY (FIRST DIGIT OF SIC CODE), WINNERS ONLY
Risk adjustment is based on Rubinstein’s model, using the value-weighted CRSP index.
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closing price on the first day of trading and the issue price)
did not generate any major anomalies, except in the largest
decile, usually referred to as the “hot” issues (10% IPOs
with largest underpricing).17
Figure 5 shows the results for this category of IPOs. For
comparison, the equally weighted standard returns of all hot
issues (both winners and losers) are displayed as well.
Although not entirely correcting for the extreme underper-
formance of all hot issues (upper plot), the weighted average
modified return of winners only (lower plot) is substantially
closer to zero, indicating that most, but not all, of the
hot-issue anomaly is in fact caused by biases in the market’s
prior about default at the issue date, in accordance with ELM.
Table 4, however, demonstrates that the hot-issue anom-
aly is also a price-level anomaly in disguise: both the mean
and median issue price of hot IPOs are below $6. Compare
this to the median IPO (the issue in the fifth decile in terms
of underpricing), which has a median issue price of $9, and
a mean of $9.69. Hence, the lower plot of figure 5 is but a
selection of figure 4.17 In our sample, the hot issues had an underpricing of 52% or more.
FIGURE 4.—ONE-MONTH RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS IN PERCENT (HORIZONTAL BARS) AND 95%-CONFIDENCE INTERVALS (VERTICAL BARS) ON 4,848 U.S.
IPOS IN THE PERIOD 1975–1995, FOR DIFFERENT HORIZONS, STRATIFIED BY ISSUE PRICE LEVEL, WINNERS ONLY
Risk adjustment is based on Rubinstein’s model, using the value-weighted CRSP index.
TABLE 3.—CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ISSUE PRICE LEVEL BY INDUSTRY; BASED ON 4,848 U.S. IPOS IN THE PERIOD 1975–1995
SIC Number Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max Std
0* 32 0.10 1.00 5.00 5.65 9.13 15.00 4.62
1* 347 0.10 1.00 5.00 7.14 11.25 200.00 12.33
2* 546 0.04 6.00 10.00 11.86 14.00 700.00 30.31
3* 1,625 0.04 5.50 9.50 11.69 13.00 1,250.00 47.13
4* 380 0.05 5.38 10.00 9.99 14.25 28.00 5.69
5* 717 0.04 5.38 10.00 9.69 13.50 30.00 5.48
6* 76 0.10 4.75 10.00 10.23 16.00 34.00 7.48
7* 740 0.10 5.00 9.50 9.49 13.00 25.00 5.22
8* 384 0.13 5.50 8.38 8.91 12.00 26.00 4.86
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D. Summary
Altogether, there seem to be few anomalies (relative to
ELM and Rubinstein’s asset-pricing model) in the U.S. IPO
aftermarket. The notable exception are issues priced below
$6. The anomalies for low-priced issues show up in other
categories (such as hot issues), because of correlation in the
categorizations.
It is surprising that something as arbitrary as issue price
has any predictive power at all. Still, this is not unlike the
finding of anomalies in changes in the market value of
low-priced call options written on the S&P 500 index. (See
Bossaerts (1998).) Low-priced call options are almost in-
variably out-of-the-money. They are the equivalent of a
highly levered position in the underlying security—an in-
expensive bet. Future research should indicate whether
low-priced IPOs are similarly perceived to be cheap bets.
Because of the low issue price, the reader may suspect
that market microstructure effects (finite tick size and rela-
tively large bid-ask spreads) have contributed to the poor
performance, even under ELM. But these must be of less
relevance for the weighted average modified return, which
is computed only for winners. Certainly at longer horizons,
winners generally trade at much higher prices, where market
microstructure impact should be negligible.
The fact that we do find occasional rejections is good
news for the methodology that is used in this article: they
demonstrate that the tests have power. A formal analysis of
power can be found in the appendix to previous versions of
FIGURE 5.—ONE-MONTH RISK-ADJUSTED RETURNS IN PERCENT (HORIZONTAL BARS) AND 95%-CONFIDENCE INTERVALS (VERTICAL BARS) ON 485 “HOT”
U.S. IPOS IN THE PERIOD 1975–1995, FOR DIFFERENT HORIZONS, ALL ISSUES (UPPER PANEL) AND WINNERS ONLY (LOWER PANEL)
“Hot” IPOs belong to the top decile in terms of issue underpricing (minimum underpricing of 52%).
Risk adjustment is based on Rubinstein’s model, using the value-weighted CRSP index.
TABLE 4.—CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ISSUE PRICE LEVEL FOR “MEDIAN” AND “HOT” ISSUES; BASED ON 4,848 U.S. IPOS IN THE PERIOD 1975–1995
Type Number Min Q1 Median Mean Q3 Max Std
Median 492 1.00 6.00 9.00 9.69 12.50 28.00 4.63
Hot 485 0.04 0.50 4.00 5.53 9.00 35.00 5.94
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the paper (available on the Internet at ftp://hss.caltech.edu/
pub/pbs/ipoold.pdf).
Even more comforting is the fact that the rejections occur
in a category of issues (below $6) that has been the subject
of regular inquiries on price manipulation by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). The statistics confirm
what the SEC suspected. That category is now generally
ignored in new studies of IPO performance (for example,
Ritter (2000), who excludes issues with an offer price below
$5).
VI. Do Financial Markets Really Learn?
The foregoing has demonstrated that ELM, in conjunc-
tion with Rubinstein’s asset-pricing model, explains the
post-issue performance of U.S. IPOs over the period 1975–
1995, with the exception of low-priced issues. ELM allows
markets to have biased beliefs about the probability of
default of an issue at the IPO date, but requires them to
update these beliefs rationally (based on Bayes’ law and the
correct likelihood).
Can we generate other evidence that the market indeed
learns to price these IPOs correctly as they mature? The
simplest way to do so would be to verify whether prices
ultimately reflect the actual probability of default, that is,
whether prices eventually converge to EMH. To test this, we
could run a standard asset-pricing test, but based only on
later returns, that is, excluding the early return history.18,19
Table 5 displays results of a standard test of Rubinstein’s
model on all returns from month k on, where k 5 1, 16,
31, . . . , 106. The test simply verifies equation (5), using a
standard t-test. Of course, we expect the test to reject for
low values of k, but we should ultimately accept for large k.
Rubinstein’s model uses the value-weighted market portfo-
lio as benchmark. For comparison, table 5 also replicates the
test with the equally weighted CRSP index and the risk-free
rate (three-month Treasury bill rate) as benchmark. Under
either benchmark, we should reject.
According to Table 5, the underperformance relative to
Rubinstein’s model (and EMH) disappears after deleting 45
months (k 5 46). There is slight overperformance for k 5
76 and k 5 91, but the reader should be warned that the
number of observations (months) is reduced to only 55 (k 5
76) and 30 (k 5 91).
Using an equally weighted market benchmark, one does
not record a rejection when k 5 1. Of course, that could
already have been read from figure 1, where the CAR
against the equally weighted CRSP index reverts back to
zero by year 10 (120 months). But the equally weighted
benchmark generates rejections for values of k from 46 on.
With the risk-free rate as benchmark, Table 5 documents
rejections for all levels of k.
Altogether, table 5 corroborates our earlier findings, that
Rubinstein’s model, in conjunction with ELM, explain the
U.S. IPO post-issue performance. The weighted average
modified returns on winners proved this directly. Indirect
evidence was provided by the change in the mean return as
we deleted more and more observations early after the IPO.
VII. Conclusion
In the aggregate, we find little evidence against rational
aftermarket price behavior for U.S. IPOs that were floated
between 1975 and 1995. Prices are set in accordance with
Rubinstein’s model. If, with hindsight, early aftermarket
price levels seemed on average to be too high, this must be
the consequence of initial optimism. There is certainly no
evidence that the market overreacted or underreacted as
news about the fate of each individual issue emerged. At a
more microscopic level, however, we find solid evidence
against rational price behavior in the aftermarket of low-
priced issues. The sign of the weighted average modified
returns indicates that the market of low-priced issues is
excessively volatile.
Before closing, it should be emphasized that the findings of
this article in no way contradict more recent studies that have
looked at IPO underperformance, such as Teoh et al. (1998).
Using standard methodology, these studies attempt to better
identify the nature of anomalous IPO pricing. (Teoh et al., for
instance, relate post-issue returns to pre-issue earnings num-
bers management.) Even when IPO markets satisfy our hy-
pothesis of efficient learning (ELM), anomalies will continue
to be found as long as EMH does not hold and as long as
researchers insist on using a testing methodology that is valid
only under EMH. What our study does is to explain the IPO
aftermarket performance puzzle entirely in terms of biases in
the market’s prior about default risk.
It may deserve emphasis that our methodology is immune
to survivorship bias by construction. The fact that our tests
18 Richard Roll suggested this test.
19 The reader may conjecture that inclusion of the early return history
would not affect the inference in large samples anyway (because the
market learns to price issues correctly), and, hence, that our exercise is
pointless. Bossaerts (1995), however, proves that the conjecture is wrong:
the asymptotic distribution of tests of EMH is generally affected by
learning, even when the latter is transient.
TABLE 5.—t-STATISTICS COMPUTED FROM IPO RETURNS OVER MONTHS k TO
120 AFTER ISSUE DATE, FOR k 5 1, 16, . . . , 106
k
Benchmarka
Noneb
Equally Weighted
CRSP Index
Value Weighted
CRSP Index
1 9.16 21.77 25.25
16 10.86 20.61 24.44
31 10.21 0.97 23.22
46 10.39 1.90 21.60
61 12.44 4.15 0.74
76 12.25 5.34 2.72
91 11.20 3.91 2.41
106 7.19 1.71 0.86
In column 2, only time value of money is adjusted for, by subtracting the three-month T-bill rate. In
columns 3 and 4, Rubinstein’s model is used to adjust for risk, with two choices for the market portfolio:
(i) the CRSP equally weighted index, (ii) the CRSP value weighted index.
Based on 4,848 U.S. IPOs in the period 1975–1995.
a Benchmark index used in risk adjustment.
b Returns are measured in excess of the three-month T bill rate.
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are based only on the winners is by design: in no way does
this reflect lack of data on IPOs that defaulted.
The methodology in the present article could be applied
to event studies of other financial markets, such as the
markets for corporate or sovereign bonds. In general, it can
be used to study the prices of any financial contract that
features a clear “default state,” in which a fixed and known
payout occurs. This includes seemingly unrelated securities,
such as straight call options, as illustrated in Bossaerts
(1998).
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